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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
l

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellant,

:

v.

;

DAVID SIMMONS &
PATRICIA KAY SIMMONS,
Defendants/Appellees•

t

Case No. 920800-CA

Priority No. 15

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from the grant of defendants' motions
to suppress evidence in a case charging both defendants with
possession of a controlled substance with the intent to
distribute, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. § 58-37-8 (Supp. 1992), in the First Judicial District Court
in and for Box Elder County, State of Utah, the Honorable Clint
S. Judkins, presiding.

This Court has jurisdiction to hear this

case pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-18a-l(2)(e) (Supp. 1992) and
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (Supp. 1992).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The issues presented in this appeal are;
1.

Did the trial court erroneously find that the

search warrants in defendants' cases were served "in the night,"
as that term is used in Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-5 (1990)?

Factual

findings supporting a trial court's decision on a motion to
suppress are subject to a clearly erroneous standard.
Bobo, 803 P.2d 1268, 1271-72 (Utah App. 1990).

State v.

Conclusions of

law arising from factual findings in a motion to suppress hearing

are subject to a correction of error standard, according no
particular deference to the trial court.

Ibid.

In this case the

trial court's determination that the warrants were served "in the
night" also required a statutory interpretation of the meaning of
that term as it is used in section 77-23-5.

"'[An appellate

court will] review for correctness a trial court's statutory
interpretation, according it no particular deference.'"

State v.

Singh, 819 P.2d 356, 359 (Utah App. 1991) (citations omitted).
2.

Did the trial court erroneously conclude, under

State v. Rowe, 196 Utah Adv. Rep. 14 (Utah Sept. 28, 1992) (Rowe
II), that because police officers in these cases did not also
possess valid arrest warrants, it was compelled to suppress
evidence obtained in reliance on an invalid nighttime search
warrant?

A trial court's interpretation of the law is a legal

conclusion.

"Utah appellate courts review legal conclusions

under a correction-of-error standard, granting no particular
deference to the trial court."

State v. Gonzalez, 822 P.2d 1214,

1217 (Utah App. 1991) .
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Determinative constitutional provisions, statutes and
rules are compiled in Addendum A where not set forth in the body
of this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendants David Simmons and Patricia Kay Simmons were
both charged with possession of a controlled substance with the
intent to distribute within 1,000 feet of any structure, facility

2

or grounds of a preschool or child care facility, or that such
act(s) were committed with a person younger than 18 years of age,
a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
S 58-37-8(1), (5) (Supp. 1992) (R. 2). 1 Prior to trial
defendants moved to suppress evidence (R. 33-37, 119-34).
trial court granted the motion (R. 83-84).

The

Thereafter, the State

petitioned for interlocutory review, which was granted by this
Court (R. 86-117).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On January 20, 1992, Officer Carl Merino of the Roy
City Police Department prepared an affidavit in support of a
search warrant (R. 38-41).
facts:

The warrant alleged the following

that a reliable confidential informant (CI) who had

worked with the Roy City Narcotics Strike Force for two years had
made two purchases of marijuana from one Jeremy Pettingill, first
on December 6, 1991, and second within the preceding twenty-four
hours; that on the first occasion Pettingill told the CI that he
(CI) would have to go to Willard, Utah to pick up the marijuana;
that on the second occasion the CI drove Pettingill to a
residence located at 195 South 200 West in Willard which
Pettingill identified as the source of his marijuana purchases;
and that lab tests indicated that the substance purchased by
Pettingill was marijuana (R. 39-40).
The warrant also requested, because of the lateness of
1

Record references are made only with respect to defendant
Patricia Kay Simmons' file, since the contents of both records
are nearly identical.
3

the day, no-knock nighttime authority for the search.

This

request was based on Officer Merino's experience that narcotics
dealers were arming themselves for protection generally, though
the affidavit did not state specific facts relating to this case
in support of the request for either nighttime or no-knock
authority (R. 40-41).

Judge Baldwin issued the search warrant

with the requested no-knock nighttime authority (R. 33-34, 42-23)
(Affidavit and Warrant are attached at Addendum B.)
The warrant was executed at 6:30 p.m. on January 20,
1992.

Defendants and the State stipulated that the sun set at

5:29 p.m. on that day (Findings and Order on Defendants' Motion
to Suppress, "Order," R. 83-84, attached at Addendum C). The
search yielded marijuana, various items relating to the
possession and distribution of marijuana and $800, $500 of which
was cash and firearms (Record of the preliminary hearing, R. 9).
Defendants moved to suppress the seized evidence on the
ground that the affidavit lacked sufficient factual information
to support a nighttime search, relying on this Court's decision
on the same issue in State v. Rowe, 806 P.2d 730 (Utah App. 1991)
(Rowe X ) , rev'd on other grounds, 196 Utah Adv. Rep (Utah Sept.
28, 1992) (Motion to Suppress and Supporting Memorandum, R. 33-57
at 34-37).

The State responded, noting that "nighttime" for

warrant purposes was undefined under Utah law, but that under
rule 41(h), Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, "daytime" was
between 6:00 a.m. and 10:00 p.m., and further, that the affidavit
contained sufficient information to support nighttime authority
4

(Response to Motion for Suppression, R. 58-62).2
The trial court granted defendants' motion, which was
first heard on August 3, 1992 (R. 66), but continued the hearing,
before a written order issued, to October 19, 1992, because of
disagreement on the proposed findings and on account of the
issuance of Rowe II (see R. 67-79)•

At neither hearing was

evidence taken (see Minute Entries of August 8 and October 19,
1992, R. 66, 82). At the October 19, 1992 hearing the parties
discussed whether "good faith" had been previously raised
(Transcript of Suppression Hearing, R. 120-24).

The trial court

found that matter had not been raised and was not under
consideration; rather it wished that its reaffirmation of its
initial granting of suppression be specifically supported by 1)
the lack of particularity required under Rowe X and 2) that Rowe
II be distinguished because the executing officer did not also
have valid arrest warrants (R. 131-34, attached at Addendum D).
However, the trial court also specifically requested that the
State appeal its ruling (R. 132). The State appeals from the
resulting Order (see Permission for Petition to Appeal, R. 86117).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
POINT I
Nighttime searches are undefined in Utah law.

Some

jurisdictions have adopted the view that "daytime" is that period
2

On appeal the State concedes that the affidavit lacked
sufficient factual specificity to authorize nighttime entry under
Rowe i.
5

between sunrise and sunset.

Other jurisdictions have adopted the

common law view that "daytime" is that period in which there is
sufficient light to determine the features of a person, i.e., a
factual determination of darkness*

However, considering current

lifestyles, and considering the precision afforded by following
the federal rule, this Court should adopt the rule that for
warrant purposes, "in the night," as provided in Utah Code Ann. §
77-23-5 (1990), should lie between the hours of 10:00 p.m. and
6:00 a.m.
In this case the trial court merely assumed that "in
the night" was necessarily that period between sunset and
sunrise.

That unconsidered view was incorrect and necessarily

compelled an erroneous factual finding that the warrant in this
case had been served in the night.

Even if this Court should

decline to adopt the federal definition, it should nonetheless
find that the trial court erred in granting suppression under
Rowe II.
POINT II
Under Rowe II, the Utah Supreme Court held that
suppression is not a proper remedy for a procedural violation
unless the defendant can make out a fundamental violation under
the fourth amendment or that s/he suffered prejudice or bad faith
in the execution of the warrant.

Rowe II demonstrated, by the

authority it cited, that violation of section 77-23-5 is a
procedural violation only and that a lack of prejudice may be
demonstrated in circumstances other than those in which the
6

officers executing the warrant possess a valid arrest warrant.
It is defendants' burden to show that they have been
deprived of their fourth amendment rights.

In this case

defendants failed to show they suffered a fundamental violation
under the fourth amendment or that they suffered prejudice or bad
faith in the execution of the warrant. Further, the trial court
incorrectly restricted its legal analysis by ordering suppression
merely because the executing officers in this case did not also
have valid arrest warrants.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT CONCLUDED WITHOUT SUFFICIENT
BASIS THAT THE WARRANT WAS SERVED "IN THE
NIGHT" UNDER UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-23-5 (1990).
The defendants and the State stipulated that the sun
set at 5:29 p.m. on January 20, 1992 and that the warrant was
executed at about 6:30 p.m. (R. 83). From this fact the trial
court found that the warrant was executed in the nighttime (R.
83).
Factual findings supporting a trial court's decision on
a motion to suppress are subject to a clearly erroneous standard.
State v. Bobo, 803 P-2d 1268, 1271-72 (Utah App. 1990).
Conclusions of law arising from factual findings in a motion to
suppress hearing are subject to a correction of error standard,
according no particular deference to the trial court.

Ibid.

"'[An appellate court will] review for correctness a trial
court's statutory interpretation, according it no particular

7

deference.'

State v. Jaimez, [817 P.2d 822, 826] (Utah App.

1991); State v. Swapp, 808 P.2d 115f 120 (Utah App. 1991)
(citations omitted)."

State v. Singh, 819 P.2d 356, 359 (Utah

App. 1991).
Section 77-23-5 provides, in pertinent part:
(1) The magistrate must insert a
direction in the warrant that it be served in
the daytime, unless the affidavits or oral
testimony state a reasonable cause to believe
a search is necessary in the night to seize
the property prior to it being concealed,
destroyed, damaged or altered, or for other
good reason; in which case he may insert a
direction that it be served any time of the
day or night. An officer may request other
persons to assist him in conducting the
search.
Section 77-23-5 does not specifically define "in the
night."

The State has been unable to locate any relevant

legislative history.

This Court has also previously noted that

it too had "not found any Utah statutes or cases defining
'nighttime.'"

State v. Purser, 828 P.2d 515, 519 n.l (Utah App.

1992).
In Purser, this Court declined to discuss, but
identified, three views for determining what time is "nighttime"
for warrant purposes:
The first view requires a factual
determination of whether there is sufficient
natural light that one can distinguish a
person's features. See, e.g., State v.
Bumside, 113 Idaho 65, 741 P.2d 352, 356
(1987). The second view defines nighttime
according to sunrise and sunset. See, e.g.,
Grant v. Hass, 31 Tex. Civ. App. 688, 75 S.W.
342, 343 (1903) (daytime is thirty minutes
before sunrise to thirty minutes after
sunset). The last view sets forth specific

8

hours for execution of a search warrant
without special authorization. See, e.g.,
Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(h) (6:00 a.m. to 10:00
p.m.).
Id. at 519 n.l.
In Kuenzel v. State, 577 S.2d 474 (Ala. Crim. App.
1990), the trial court was found to have properly denied a motion
to suppress where the warrant, apparently lacking express
nighttime authority, was served two minutes after sunset.

There

was testimony that it was still daylight when the warrant was
served.

The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals, essentially

adopting the first view noted in Purser, held that "[t]he weight
of authority supports the conclusion that where the term
"nighttime" is not defined, the definition of "'nighttime' [is]
based on a factual determination of darkness, rather than a rigid
sunset-to-sunrise test," citing 26 A.L.R.3d at 975, 978 in
support. .Id. at 509.
However, in Commonwealth v. Grimshaw, 595 N.E.2d 302
(Mass. 1992), the court rejected the common law view that for
criminal purposes "night means 'a period when the light of day
had so far disappeared, that the fact of a person was not
discernible by the light of the sun or twilight.'"
(citations omitted).

JEd. at 306

Instead, the court adopted rule 41(h),

Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,3 which provides that
3

Rule 41(c), Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, provides
in pertinent part:
The warrant shall be served in the daytime,
unless the issuing authority, by appropriate
provision in the warrant, and for reasonable
9

nighttime does not begin for warrant purposes until 10:00 p.m.
Noting that no universal standard had emerged from its study of
the issue, the court opined the federal rule was the one "that
best protects the public from unreasonable intrusions by the
police, is in keeping with current life-styles, and gives the
police notice as to the precise time in all seasons when
permission for a nighttime search must be requested."

.Id., at

307.
In this case the trial court's factual determination of
"nighttime" is totally dependent on the definition it selects.
There was evidently no argument on this point, but it is implicit
in the trial court's findings that it assumed that "nighttime"
was that period between sunset and sunrise.

In complete

disregard for the alternative common law view, the trial court
made no factual determination of darkness or that there was
insufficient light to discern defendants' faces.
As the court in Kuenzel noted, defining "daytime" as
that period between sunrise and sunset appears to be a minority
position.

However, neither definition of "daytime" has the

cause shown, authorizes its execution at
times other than daytime. . . .
Rule 41(h), Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, provides
in pertinent part:
The term "daytime" is used in this rule to
mean the hours from 6:00 a.m. to 10:00 p.m.

10

precision offered by the federal rule, which specifies the hours
of "daytime" and clearly puts the police on notice of whether,
under the circumstances, they must request nighttime authority
and whether their execution of the warrant is authorized.
Similarly, the federal rule puts the public on notice of those
periods in which a warrant may not be served without the
specialized authority required by section 77-23-5. Furthermore,
as the court in Grimshaw noted, service until 10:00 p.m. is in
keeping with current lifestyles and is thereby not intrinsically
repulsive.
For all the reasons referenced above, this Court should
interpret the phrase "in the night" as it is used in section
77-23-5 to mean the period between 10:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m.
Under that definition, the trial court erroneously found that the
warrant, as a matter of fact, had been executed "in the
nighttime."
POINT II
UNDER ROWE H THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE SHOULD BE
APPLIED ONLY IN CASES WHERE PROCEDURAL ERRORS
IN ISSUING WARRANTS ALSO RESULT IN
FUNDAMENTAL VIOLATIONS OF THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT, ARE PREJUDICIAL TO DEFENDANTS OR
DEMONSTRATE BAD FAITH. IN THIS CASE THE
TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY CONCLUDED UNDER ROWE
II THAT ONLY THE EXISTENCE OF VALID ARREST
WARRANTS COULD SAVE EVIDENCE SEIZED PURSUANT
TO A PROCEDURALLY DEFECTIVE SEARCH WARRANT
FROM EXCLUSION.
If this Court declines to adopt the effective federal
definition of "nighttime," i.e., from 10:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m.,
but instead holds that "nighttime" is either 1) strictly defined
11

by that period from sunset to sunrise, or 2) that period in which
the face of a person is not discernible by the light of the sun
or twilight, i.e., a factual determination of darkness, then this
Court should nevertheless find that the trial court erred in
granting defendant's motion to suppress under State v. Rowe, 196
Utah Adv. Rep. 14 (Utah Sept. 28, 1992) (Rowe II),
A.

Rowe II Compels Suppression Only
Upon Proof of a Fundamental Violation
of the Fourth Amendment, Prejudice
or Bad Faith.
In Rowe II, the Utah Supreme Court reversed this

Court's holding in State v. Rowe, 806 P.2d 730 (Utah App. 1991),
that a warrant supported by an affidavit lacking sufficient
specific facts to authorize nighttime entry under Utah Code Ann.
§ 77-23-5 (1990) required suppression of evidence seized in
execution of the warrant.

The court stated:

"Only a 'fundamental' violation of
[a rule of criminal procedure] requires
automatic suppression, and a violation
is 'fundamental' only where it, in
effect, renders the search
unconstitutional under traditional
fourth amendment standards. Where the
alleged violation . . . is not
'fundamental' suppression is required
only where: (1) there was 'prejudice'
in the sense that the search might not
have occurred or would not have been so
abrasive if the rule had been followed,
or (2) there is evidence of intentional
and deliberate disregard of a provision
of the rule. . . •
. . . It is only where the
violation also implicates fundamental,
constitutional concerns, is conducted
in bad-faith or has substantially
prejudiced the defendant that exclusion
may be an appropriate remedy." [Quoting
12

State v, Fixel, 744 P.2d 1366, 1369
(Utah 1987) (emphasis is original),]
The majority of courts that have
examined the issue have determined that
procedural violations in the execution of
search warrants do not require suppression of
the evidence seized.
Id. at 15 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).

The court found

the defendant had not been prejudiced where he was unable to show
that the search would not have otherwise taken place or would
have been less abrasive if the rule had been followed, and
particularly because the police had authority for a nighttime
entry pursuant to a valid arrest warrant for the owner of the
residence which was the subject of the search.

id., at 16.

In support of its contention that failure to strictly
conform to section 77-23-5 was only a procedural violation, Rowe
II cited a number of cases.

Rowe, 196 Utah Adv. Rep. at 16 n.ll.

Typical of those cases was United States v. Searp, 586 F.2d 1117
(6th Cir. 1978).
In Searp, the affidavit lacked "reasonable cause" to
support a warrant authorizing nighttime entry under rule 41(c),
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.

However, while noting that

nighttime entry may be a severe intrusion, the protection
afforded by the rule was essentially prophylactic, i.e.,
procedural, and not intrinsically a part of the fourth amendment
right to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures. Id., at
1121-24*

Therefore, where there was no demonstration of

prejudice or bad faith, "requiring suppression in all cases would
be a remedy out of all proportion to the benefits gained . . . ."
13

Id, at 1123.

See also State v. Brock, 653 P.2d 543, 547 (Or.

1982) (Oregon statute providing for nighttime authorization was
"concerned with minimizing the heightened risks and apprehensions
associated with a nighttime intrusion into the home, not with the
overall protection against unjustified searches and seizures").
Rowe II also cited a number of cases supporting its
view that absent a showing of prejudice procedural violations
relating to the fourth amendment do not require suppression.
Rowe, 196 Utah Adv. Rep. at 16 n.ll.

See United States v.

Schoenheit, 856 F.2d 74, 77 (8th Cir. 1988) (finding that
although the affidavit lacked reasonable cause to support a
nighttime search, the defendant failed to demonstrate that the
search would not have occurred or been less abrasive if executed
before 10:00 p.m.); Searp, 586 F.2d at 1122 (search pursuant to
defective nighttime warrant justified where judge knew search
would take place at night and the defendant's mother knew that
police intended to search the house); United States v. Shelton,
742 F. Supp. 1491, 1503 (D. Wyo. 1990) (evidence seized under
nighttime warrant lacking reasonable cause held admissible where
there was no evidence of prejudice, abrasive search or that
searches would not have occurred even if nighttime warrants had
not been promptly executed).
Rowe II also cited Utah case law affirming the view
that only fundamental violations of rights compel suppression.
Rowe, 196 Utah Adv. Rep. at 15-16 n. 9.

In Fixel, the court

refused to suppress evidence gathered by a city police officer
14

merely because he acted outside his statutory authority.
1368-69.

Ijd. at

In State v. Buck, 756 P.2d 700f 703 (Utah 1988), the

court found that the defendant's privacy rights were not
prejudicially infringed by a warrant mistakenly executed in noknock fashion where the warrant was otherwise valid and the
defendant was not at home.
In none of these cases cited in Rowe IX was it required
that technically invalid entries into residences be saved by the
presence of a valid arrest warrant, for the obvious reason that a
lack of prejudice may be demonstrated in innumerable ways.
Indeed, Rowe II invokes the harmless error standard in defining a
defendant's necessary showing of prejudice.

Rowe, 196 Utah Adv.

Rep. at 16 n.13 (citing rule 30, Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure, and State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 120 (Utah 1989)
(errors which are "sufficiently inconsequential that there is no
reasonable likelihood that the error affected the outcome of the
proceedings")).

Thus, in State v. Garcia, 501 N.E.2d 527 (Mass.

App. Ct. 1986), the court found the defendant unprejudiced by the
fact that items seized in a nighttime search would also have been
discovered if the search had been conducted the following day.
Id. at 530.
B.

Defendant Failed to Assume His
Burden of Proof, and the Trial
Court Incorrectly Applied the
the Law under Rowe II.
1.

Defendant Bears the Burden of
Proof to Show Fourth Amendment
Violation.

"'The proponent of a motion to suppress has the burden
15

of establishing that his own Fourth Amendment rights were
violated by the challenged search or seizure.'"

State v. Atwood,

831 P.2d 1056, 1058 n.l (Utah App. 1992) (quoting State v.
Marshall, 791 P.2d 880, 886 (Utah App. 1990) from Rakas v.
Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 130 n.l, 99 S. Ct. 421, 424 n.l (1978)).
"Evidence sought to be excluded is admissible • . . until the
accused has established that his rights • • . have been invaded."
Ibid, (citations omitted).
Rowe II explicitly stands for the proposition that a
violation of section 77-23-5 is procedural only, and does not of
itself constitute an infringement of fourth amendment rights
unless there has been a showing of prejudice or bad faith.
Therefore, in addition to showing a procedural violation related
to his fourth amendment rights, defendant bears the further
burden of demonstrating prejudice.

Rowe, 196 Utah Adv. Rep. at

16. See also United States v. Schoenheit, 856 F.2d 74, 77 (8th
Cir. 1988) (no showing of prejudice where the defendant failed to
demonstrate that the search would not have occurred if the rule
had been followed or been less abrasive if executed before 10:00
p»m.) •
In this case the record does not show that defendants
did anything more than show that the sun set at 5:29 p.m. and
that the warrant was executed at about 6:30 p.m. (R. 83). Since,
as argued above (Appellant's Brief at Point I), there presently
exists no Utah authority defining "nighttime" under section 7723-5, there is substantial doubt as to whether defendants even
16

established a technical violation of the statute.

In any event,

defendants never alleged that there was no justification for
nighttime authorization/ that there were no facts which would
have justified a nighttime entry, that the entry was at all
abrasive in that defendants were discovered asleep, undressed or
were compromised in their privacy other than as they would have
in an undeniable daytime search, or, finally, that evidence was
discovered which would not have been seized if the search were
conducted the following day.
Further, defendants never alleged that the police acted
in bad faith in either securing or in executing the warrant.

In

sum, defendants have failed to sustain their burden that they
were deprived of their fourth amendment rights as a result of
official misconduct.
2.

The Trial Court Incorrectly
Assumed That Without the Existence
of Valid Arrest Warrants the
Evidence Must be Suppressed.

In deciding defendants' motion to suppress the trial
court analyzed Rowe II.

It is apparent from the trial court's

remarks that it was fixated by the supreme court's finding that
the defendant had not suffered prejudice because the police also
had a valid arrest warrant for the owner of the premises (? 131-

k

Defendants asserted at the suppression hearing that their
motion was based on the fact that the police officers had no
justification for nighttime entry (R. 130). Defendants are
entirely mistaken in this assertion. The motion to suppress was
directed exclusively toward the deficiency of the affidavit under
Rowe Jl (see Motion to Suppress and Supporting Memor"dum, R. 3317

34).

The trial court's order reflects its inappropriately

constrained view of the prejudice requirement discussed in Rowe

3. Because there is no evidence before the
Court that the officers who executed the
search warrant in this case had in their
possession a valid warrant for the arrest of
any person within the premises searched, the
procedural defect in failing to include
sufficient grounds for nighttime entry, and
the nighttime execution of this search
warrantf amounted to a fundamental violation
of the Defendants' rights requiring
suppression of the evidence seized pursuant
to the search warrant. State v. Fixel, 744
P.2d 1366 (Utah 1987); State v. Rowe, 196
Utah Adv. Rep. 14 (Utah 1992).
(Order, R. 84).
A trial court's interpretation of the law is a legal
conclusion.

"Utah appellate courts review legal conclusions

under a correction-of-error standard, granting no particular
deference to the trial court."

State v. Gonzalez, 822 P.2d 1214,

1217 (Utah App. 1991) .
As noted above, Rowe II, upon which the trial court in
this case so deliberately relied, identified, by citation to
authority, a broad range of nonprejudicial circumstances which
condoned the admission of evidence seized in violation of
procedural rules or statutes (see Appellant's Brief at 11-15).
None of those circumstances happened to involve the fortuitous
existence of valid arrest warrants.

In failing to recognize that

a lack of prejudice may be demonstrated in circumstances other
than those in which the officers happen to have an arrest
warrant, the trial court incorrectly cut short the appropriate
18

inquiry and improperly granted suppression.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, the State respectfully requests
this Court adopt the effective federal definition of "nighttime,"
i.e., from 10:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m., and thereby reverse the trial
court's order granting suppression.

If this Court declines to

adopt the federal definition, but instead holds that "nighttime"
is strictly defined by that period from sunset to sunrise, then
the State requests that this case be remanded for an evidentiary
hearing on the issues of prejudice and bad faith, consistent with
Rowe II.

If this Court should hold that "nighttime" is that

period in which the face of a person is not discernible by the
light of the sun or twilight, then the State requests this case
be remanded for the additional factual determination of whether
the warrant was served in darkness, again consistent with Rowe

n.

^
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / Y

day of June, 1993.

JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General

KENNETH A. BRONSTON
Assistant Attorney General
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

United States Constitution
AMENDMENT IV [Unreasonable searches and seizures.]
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.
Utah Code Ann. (Supp. 1992)
77-23-5. Time for service - Officer may request assistance.
(1) The magistrate must insert a direction in the warrant
that it be served in the daytime, unless the affidavits or oral
testimony state a reasonable cause to believe a search is
necessary in the night to seize the property prior to it being
concealed, destroyed, damaged or altered, or for other good
reason; in which case he may insert a direction that it be served
any time of the day or night. An officer may request other
persons to assist him in conducting the search.
(2) The search warrant shall be served within ten days from
the date of issuance. Any search warrant not executed within such
time shall be void and shall be returned to the court or
magistrate as not executed.
58-37-8. Prohibited acts - Penalties.
(1) Prohibited acts A - Penalties:
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful
for any person to knowingly and intentionally:
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess with
intent to produce, manufacture, or dispense, a controlled or
counterfeit substance;
(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, or
to agree, consent, offer, or arrange to distribute a controlled
or counterfeit substance;
(iii) possess a controlled substance in the course of his
business as a sales representative of a manufacturer or
distributor of substances listed in Schedules II through V except
that he may possess such controlled substances whc :Aey are
prescribed to him by a licensed practitioner; ci
(iv) possess a controlled or counterfeit substance with
intent to distribute.
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (l)(a)
with respect to:
(i) a substance classified in Schedule I or II is guilty
of a second degree felony and upon a second or subsequent
conviction of Subsection (l)(a) is guilty of a first degree
felony;

(ii) a substance classified in Schedule III or IV, or
marijuana, is guilty of a third degree felony, and upon a second
or subsequent conviction punishable under this subsection is
guilty of a second degree felony; or
(iii) a substance classified in Schedule V is guilty of a
class A misdemeanor and upon a second or subsequent conviction
punishable under this subsection is guilty of a third degree
felony.
•

• • •

(5) Prohibited acts E - Penalties:
(a) Notwithstanding other provisions of this section, a
person not authorized under this chapter who commits any act
declared to be unlawful under this section, Title 58, Chapter
37a, Utah Drug Paraphernalia Act, or under Title 58, Chapter 37b,
Imitation Controlled Substances Act, is upon conviction subject
to the penalties and classifications under Subsection (5)(b) if
the act is committed:
(i) in a public or private elementary or secondary school
or on the grounds of any of those schools;
(ii) in a public or private vocational school or
post-secondary institution or on the grounds of any of those
schools or institutions;
(iii) in those portions of any building, park, stadium,
or other structure or grounds which are, at the time of the act,
being used for an activity sponsored by or through a school or
institution under Subsections (5)(a)(i) and (ii);
(iv) in or on the grounds of a preschool or child-care
facility;
(v) in a public park, amusement park, arcade, or
recreation center;
(vi) in a church or synagogue;
(vii) in a shopping mall, sports facility, stadium,
arena, theater, movie house, playhouse, or parking lot or
structure adjacent thereto;
(viii) in a public parking lot or structure;
(ix) within 1,000 feet of any structure, facility, or
grounds included in Subsections (5)(a)(i) through (viii); or
(x) with a person younger than 18 years of age,
regardless of where the act occurs.
(b) A person convicted under this subsection is guilty of a
first degree felony and shall be imprisoned for a term of not
less than five years if the penalty that would otherwise have
been established but for this subsection would have been a first
degree felony. Imposition or execution of the sentence may not be
suspended, and the person is not eligible for parole until the
minimum term of imprisonment under this subsection has been
served.
(c) If the classification that would otherwise have been
established would have been less than a first degree felony but
for this subsection, a person convicted under this subsection is
guilty of one degree more than the maximum penalty prescribed for
that offense.

(d) It is not a defense to a prosecution under this
subsection that the actor mistakenly believed the individual to
be 18 years of age or older at the time of the offense or was
unaware of the individual's true age; nor that the actor
mistakenly believed that the location where the act occurred was
not as described in Subsection (5)(a) or was unaware that the
location where the act occurred was as described in Subsection
(5)(a).

ADDENDUM B

ZK TEE CZRCUIT
COURT
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT
The undersigned, being first duly sworn, deposes and says;
That the affiant has reason to believe that:
( ) On the person(s) of:
(Z ) On the premises known as: A TWO STORY DWELLING LOCATED AT
APPROZ. 195 SOUTH 200 WEST/ WILLARD, UTAH. FIRST HOUSE NORTH OF
200 SOUTH OK TEE EAST SIDE OF 200 WEST. A WEZTE EOUSI WITH BROWN
TRIM, FRONT DOOR OH -TEE WEST SIDE OF TEE HOUSE/ FORCE HAS GREEK
ASTRO TURF, DRIVEWAY OH SEE SOUTE SIDE OF TEE HOUSE.
( )

In the vehicle(s) described as:

In the City of WILLARD
County of BOX ELDER
state of Utah, there is now certain property or evidence described
as:
1—MAREFUANA, a green leafy substance in dried form.
2—HATERIALS USED TO PACKAGE MARIJUANA, s p e c i f i c a l l y , p l a s t i o

sandwich bags.
3—MATERIALS TOR US ISO UARUUANA:
a—cigarette papers,- small sheets of flammable paper with
adhesive on-one side,
b—pipes, used-to smoke -atari juana,
o—roach clips, used to hold a marijuana cigarette while being
smoked.
4—FERSONAL NOTES, records of narcotic transactions, listing names,
dates? amounts sold.
5 — F R U I T S O F NARCOTIC TRANSACTIONS, U.S. currency, cash in various
denominations, STRICT FORCE MONEY.
6—ALL HANDGUNS, RIFLES, AND T0TEER WEAPONS TEAT CAN PRODUCE BODILY
INJURY.

and that -said property or evidence:
<Z ) Was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed
(I ) Has been used, or is possessed with the purpose of
..being used to commit or conceal the commission of an
offense
t* ) Is -evidence of illegal conduct
-The facts establishing the grounds for issuance of a search warrant
are:
YOUR AFFIANT, "CARL MERINO, HAS BEEN EMPLOYED AS A ROY CITY POLICE
OFFICER FOR TEE FAST TWO YEARS. PRIOR TO SEAT TIME YOUR AFFIANT
SPENT FIVE YEARS AS A RESERVE POLICE OFFICER FOR OGDEN CITY POLICE
DEPARTMENT. YOUR AFFIANT IS CURRENTLY ASSIGNED TO TEE WEBER/HORGAN
NARCOTICS STRIKE FORCE AND EAS BEEN GIVEN TEE RESPONSIBILITY OF
INVESTIGATING NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING AND POSSESSION VIOLATIONS ZN
WEBER AND MORGAN'COUNTIES. YOUR AFFIANT EAS ATTENDED AN 8.E0UR

AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT

PAGE 2 WILLARD, UTAH

CLASS OK. KARCOTICS DURING BASIC ACADEMY TRAINING, A 16 HOUR CLASS
OH CRACK COCAINE/ AND SEVERAL OTHER TRAINING SESSIONS OK VARIOUS
ASPECTS OP DRUG IKVESTIGATIOKS. YOUR AFFIANT IS CURRENTLY ATTBKDIKG
TEE UTAH DRUG ACADEMY AND HAS JUST FINISHED 8 HOURS OF DRUG
IDENTIFICATION AND CULTIVATION OF MARIJUANA.
YOUR AFFIANT EAS
ASSISTED IK SEVERAL SEARCH WARRANTS INVOLVING KARCOTICS, AND EAS
ASSISTED IK NUXEROUS CONTROLLED PURCHASES OF KARCOTICS. YOUR
AFFIANT EAS WORKED WITH OTHER KARCOTICS AGENTS INVESTIGATING
KARCOTICS DISTRIBUTION AND POSSESSION CASES.
YOUR AFFIANT IS
CURRENTLY INVESTIGATING A MARIJUANA POSSESSION AND DISTRIBUTION
VIOLATION OCCURRING AT A RESIDENCE IN WILLARD CITY, UTAH,
01*1 EAS WORKED WITS TEE WEBER/MORGAN STRICT FORCE
VOLUNTARILY. C I U EAS MADE SEVERAL CONTROLLED KARCOTICS PURCHASES
UNDER YOUR AFFIANTS SUPERVISION.
ON 12/6/91 C I U MADE A CONTROLLED PURCHASE OF 1/8 OUNCE OF
MARIJUANA FROM JEREMY PETTING ILL. JEREMY TOLD C I U TEAT EE GOT THE
MARIJUANA FROM A LOCATION IN WILLARD. C I U WAS TO MEET JEREMY AT
TEE SMITH S EDWARDS STORE ON 12/6/91 TO PICK UP TEE MARIJUANA,
AFTER JEREMY PICKED IT UP IN WILLARD. YOUR AFFIANT WAS SUPERVISING
TEIS PURCHASE. AT 1659 HOURS ON 12/6/91 JEREMY APPROACHED C I U FROM
TEE NORTE AT SMITE *' "EDWARDS PARKING TOT AND GAVE C I U TEE
MARIJUANA TEAT WAS PURCHASED.
WITHIN THE LAST 24 HOURS, C I U AGAIN MADE ARRANGEMENTS WITH
JEREMY FETTINGIL TO PURCHASE MARIJUANA. JEREMY AGAIN STATED THAT HE
WOULD GO TO WILLARD TO GET TEE MARIJUANA AND- STATED THAT CI#1 WOULD
HAVE TO DRIVE. C I U DROVE JEREMY TO A RESIDENCE LOCATED ON NORTHEAST CORNER OF 200 SOUTH 200 WEST IN WILLARD AND PURCHASED
APPROXXMATELY ONE OUNCE OF MARIJUANA. C I U DROVE DIRECTLY TO TEE
RESIDENCE-AND IS CERTAIN OF-TEE LOCATION. JEREMY TOLD Clfl THAT
THIS-CAS TEE -SAMS LOCATION THAT-JEREMY OBTAINED TEE MARIJUANA FROM
IN TEE r naST~BUY. JEREMY ALSO TOLD CI#1 TEAT THIS LOCATION IS
.JEREMY'S "SOURCE OF MARIJUANA AND TEAT THERE IS MORE AT TEXS SAKE
LOCATION. JEREMY TOLD C I U TEAT EE BAD PURCHASED MARIJUANA AT THIS
•RESIDENCE ON 1-20-92 FOR HIMSELF.
Your Affiant believes that -the named premises, and person should be
searched .for .drug -paraphernalia. Affiant knows from experience and
training that these items are almost always found on premises where
-narcotic search warrants have been .served. Your Affiant also Knows
that the suspect must keep such iferns on hand-to test or to allow
customers to -use the substance being purchased.
Your Affiant believes the premises should be searched for reoords
-of narcotic* sales and residency papers. Your affiant Knows from
past execution of numerous search warrants that suspects often Keep
such reoords to shov amounts purchased, dates of purchases/ who
purchased, and especially drug indebtedness.
Your affiant believes that the named premises should be searched
for packaging material, suspects selling Marijuana have to package
the -drug -from larger quantities to be sold. Further, your Affiant
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lieves that the premises is an ongoing operation, and these items
uld be on hand for the purpose ef selling the substance.
ur Affiant prays for a night time service as veil as no-knock
rvice of the warrant. Tour affiant knows form experience and
•aining that sore and more narcotics dealers are arming themselves
>r protection against one another as veil as from narcotics users.
>ur affiant has been on numerous narootie search warrants where
.rearms are available to suspects inside the premises. Further,
>ur affiant believes it is safer for the officers serving tne
arrant as veil as non-participants to the narootie sales / if the
tticers have the oover of -darkness as veil as no-knock service.
urther grounds for issuance of a search warrant are attached
areto and incorporated herein.
ee attachment(s)

'our a-ffiant considers the information received from the
ionfidential informant reliable because:
!I#1 "HAS GIVES YOUR AFFIANT PULL HAKE/ DOB, AND ADDRESS. CI#1 HAS
10 KNOWN CRIMINAL CHARGE PENDING. CZfl HAS WORKED WITS TEE STRIKE
?ORCE FOR APPROXIMATELY-TOO-YEAES. -CI#1-XS CURRENTLY ENROLLED IN
TEE UTAH POLICE ACADEMY. CI#1 HAS GIVEN INFORMATION ZK TEE PAST
7EICE HAS BEEN USED TO KATE CONTROLLED PURCHASES 07 NARCOTICS. TEE
INFORMATION IS FRESH AND YOUR AFFIANT BELIEVES IT TO EE RELIABLE.
The .following Information corroborates the facts given by the
confidential informant:
CI?1 STATED TEAT TEE CI WOULD PURCHASE ONE-EIGHTH OUNCE OF
MARIJUANA.
CI#1 WAS ABLE TO PURCHASE TEE ONE-EIGHTH OUNCE OF
MARIJUANA. CI*1 STATED TEAT EE WOULD PURCHASE APPROXIMATELY ONE
OUNCE OF MARIJUANA TEROUGE JEREMY AND HIS SOURCE, AND WAS AGAIN
ABLE TO HAKE TEE PURCHASE OF APPROXIMATELY ONE OUNCE OF MARIJUANA.
.ZEE TEST -PERFORMED ON TEE FIRST ONE-EIGHTH OUNCE OF MARIJUANA
PURCHASED TEROUGE JEREMY CAMS BACK POSITIVE FOR MARIJUANA. THIS
TEST WAS CONDUCTED EY-THE NORTEERN UTAH CRIMINALISTIC LAB. A FIELD
~TEST"OF A-EAMPLE OF "THE .ONE OUNCE OF MARIJUANA PURCHASED WITHIN THE
LAST 24 HOURS SHOWED POSITIVE FOR MARIJUANA.
•Wherefore the affiant prays that a search warrant be issued for the
seizure pf said items:
( ) In the daytime
(Z) At any time day or night because there is reason to
believe it is necessary to seize the property prior to t
being concealed, destroyed, damaged, altered or for
other good reasons as follows:

AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT—FA6E 4 WILLARD, UTAH
JEOUR AFFIANT BELIEVES THAT TFRRB XS X QUANTITY OF MARIJUANA XT TEE
RESIDENCE XV glLtlftl), BTAE XT THIS TINE AND TEAT TO DELAY WOULD
XFHORDTES RESIDENTSftMPrJTTIKE TO 6SLL, DESTROY, OR HOVE TEE
KARUUAKA* • DUE TO THE LATE SOUR 07 THE DAS YOUR AFFIANT REQUESTS
TEAT TEE WARRANT BE ISSUED FOR DAY OR NIGHT TIKE SERVICE.
It is further requested that the officer executing the requested
warrant ztot .be .required -to give notice of his authority or purpose
because:
(x ) The property sought may be quickly destroyed/ disposed
-of or-secreted.
t ) "Physical harm-may result to any person if notice were
-given.
This danger believes to exist because x

IH THE CIRCUIT
COURT
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
*****************************************************************

SEARCH WARRANT
TO ANY PEACE OFFICER ZK TEE STATE OF UTAH:
Proof by affidavit under oath haying been made this day before me
by: AGENT CARL MERINO
J am
satisfied that there is probable cause to believe that:
( ) On the person(s) of:
(Z) On the premises known as: A TWO STORY DWELLING LOCATED A T
APPRO!. 195 SOUTS 200 WEST/ WXLLARD, UTAH. FIRST SOUSE NORTE OF
200 SOUTS ON TEE EAST SIDE OF 200 WEST. A WEXTS SOUSE WITS BROWN
TRIM, FRONT DOOR ON TEE WE8T SIDE OF TEE SOUSE, PORCH SAS GREEN
ASTRO TURF, DRIVEWAY ON TEE SOUTS SIDE OF TEH SOUSE*
( }

In the vehicle(s) described as:

In the city of WILLARD
County .of BOX ELDER
State of Utah, there is not being possessed or concealed certain
property or evidence described as:
1—MARIJUANA, a green leafy substanoe in dried form*
2—MATERIALS USED TO PACKAGE MARIJUANA, Specifically, plastic
sandwich bags.
3—MATERIALS FOR USING MARIJUANA:
- a—cigarette papers, small sheets of flammable paper with
adhesive on one side,
b—pipes, used to smoke marijuana,
c—roach clips, used to hold a marijuana cigarette while being
smoked*
4—PERSONAL NOTES, records of narcotic transactions, listing names,
dates, amounts sold*
5—FRUITS OF NARCOTIC TRANSACTIONS, U.S. Currency, cash in various
denominations, STRIKE FORCE HONEY*
6—ALL HANDGUNS, RIFLES, AND OTHER WEAPONS TEAT CAN PRODUCE BODILY
INJURY.

Which property or evidence:
(Z) Was unlawfully acquired-or is unlawfully possessed
(X) Has been used, or is possessed with the purpose of
being used to commit or conceal the commission of.an
offense
(Z) Is evidence of illegal conduct

10V *2LB TEEZSP0S2 COKMMOJED
( ) In the daytime
(X) Xt any time, day or night
(X) To execute without notice of authority or purpose
To make a search of the above, named or described person (s),
premises and vehicle (s) for the herein above described property or
evidence,..and .if.you find the -£ame>»-or any part thereof, to bring
it forthwith before me at the CI&CUIZ Court, County of WEBER
state of Utah, or retain such^cpj>&rty in your custody subject to
the order of this court.
GIVEN UNDER MY HAND AND DA'

193X

ADDENDUM C

BRIGHAK D'STPin
JAY D. EDMONDS #957
Attorney for David Simmons
1660 Orchard Drive
Salt Lake City, UT 84106
Telephone: 484-3218

1121 f,i CS2

OCT 3 J

IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR BOX ELDER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
-

vs

FINDINGS AND ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO SUPPRESS

-

DAVID SIMMONS and
PATRICIA KAY SIMMONS,

Criminal Nos. 921000014
921000015

Defendants.

The Defendants' Motion to Suppress came before the Court
for hearing on August 3, 1992, and for rehearing on October 19, 1992;
defendants were each present with counsel and the State was represented by Jon J. Bunderson, Box Elder County Attorney.

A written

Motion to Suppress evidence in these cases was previously filed
and supporting Memoranda were filed by both parties.
a Supplemental Memorandum herein.

The State filed

The parties stipulated that the

search warrant in these cases was executed at 6:30 p.m. on January
20, 1992 and that the sun set at 5:29 p.m. that day.

The Court,

having heard the arguments and representations of counsel and having considered the Memoranda in support of and opposition to the
motion, and being otherwise fully advised herein, the Court now
makes the following findings:
1.

That the search warrant in these cases was executed

in the nighttime.
^.^^
MICROFILMED

2. That the affidavit in support of the seaifefte\terxaiit^_
^ZtOoSnR^

alleges no specific facts justifying a nighttime search as required by §77-23-5(1), Utah Code Ann., but rather alleges matters
based upon the affiant's general knowledge and experience in drug
cases.
3. Because there is no evidence before the Court that
the officers who executed the search warrant in this case had in
their possession a valid warrant for the arrest of any person within
the premises searched, the procedural defect in failing to include
sufficient grounds for nighttime entry, and the nighttime execution
of this search warrant, amounted to a fundamental violation of the
Defendants' rights requiring suppression of the evidence seized
pursuant to the search warrant.

State v. Fixel, 744 P.2d 1366 (Utah

1987); State v. Rowe, 196 Utah Adv. Rep. 14 (Utah 1992).
Based upon the foregoing findings, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED
that all evidence seized pursuant to the execution of the search
warrant in these cases, and the fruits of all such eyi^ence, be,
and the same are hereby suppressed.
DATED this IP day of 0JLubei, 199,
BY THE COURT1

FORM AND CONTENT APPROVED
ANS-eeetaEECEfVED:
BUNDERSON
Elder County Attorney

__
S.g JtJDKINS
First District Judge

ADDENDUM D

1

exclusionary rule is the appropriate remedy for

2

violation of the nighttime search warrant provisions

3

of section 77-23-10?"

4

That's what they're referring to in the second to the

5

last paragraph that I read earlier.

6

That's the issue they ruled on.

I think it's unfortunate that they have

7

clouded it a bit by throwing in the warrant of arrest

8

provision, but that's how they framed the issue and

9

that's how they answered the issue.

So I would submit

10

that what we're seeing here is simply that the

11

exclusionary rule doesn't apply to this particular

12

statutory violation.

13

THE COURT:

14

struggled with this.

15

several times since it first came out, because I knew

16

it would be pertinent to the motion before the court,

In ruling on this, gentlemen, I
As I indicated, I've read this

17 I or at least on appeal that someone would review it.
18

I'm not really sure what Chief Justice

19

Hall is saying in this, other than, and I'm

referring

20

to the bottom of page 15 and it begins with "It is of

21

particular significance that in addition to the search

22

warrant the officers carried a valid warrant for the

23

arrest."

24

to this case.

25

both concurred on that very point.

He goes on and talks about how that applied
Justice Durham and Justice

Zimmerman

Howe and Stewart

1

also thought it of particular significance that a

2

search warrant had been issued.

3

In the Simmons case, the case before this

4

court, no search warrant is issued, so what this court

5

has to do is excise that part of the Supreme Court's

6

decision and see if it applies to this case.

7

words, overturning Rowe.

8

but I don't think they have in this case.

9

gone to the extent that they said if you have a search

In other

They very well may do it,
They've

10

warrant out there we will overturn it, or, excuse me,

11

an arrest warrant, we will overturn it.

12

well may overturn it if there isn't a search warrant,

13

but they didn't in this case.

They very

14

Mr. Bunderson, I'd encourage you to appeal

15

my decision to the Court of Appeals, but at this point

16

in time, to be consistent with Rowe one, and at least

17

what I can perceive to be consistent with Rowe two,

18

I've got to deny -- I've got to grant the motion to

19

suppress based on the earlier hearing.

20
21
22

MR. BUNDERSON:

So basically we're excluding the

evidence under the exclusionary rule?
THE COURT:

Yes, based on Rowe one and to the

23

extent that Rowe two I don't think applies to that

24

because there was no search warrant -- excuse me, no

25

arrest warrant in this particular case.

1
2

MR. BUNDERSON:

Okay.

And the remedy you're

ordering, then, is exclusion of the evidence?

3

THE COURT:

Supression of the evidence.

I find

4

that pursuant to those rules that this is a

5

fundamental violation of the defendants' rights.

6
7

MR. BUNDERSON:

we can probably confuse the law even further.

8
9

I think that narrows it enough so

MR. EDMONDS:

What do we do now about the good

faith exception finding?

10

THE COURT:

This court isn't considering that

11

now.

That wasn't brought before the court at the

12

previous hearing.

13

MR. EDMONDS:

May I suggest that the order -- the

14

proposed order that Mr. Hutchison submitted, which, by

15

the way, I drafted, just be signed by the court, with

16

the delineation?

17
18

THE COURT:

No.

I want that restructured.

Either you can do it or Mr. Bunderson can do it.

I

19 I found that the reason for the supression in this case
20

was State vs. Rowe one.

21

specifically ennunciated that you have to have

22

particularized

23

search.

24

order.

25 I

The court in that case

circumstances to justify a nighttime

I think that should be reflected in the

Then we can include this in it, that e\ *,n

though Rowe two has come out, in this case the court
distinguishes it from Rowe two in as much as in this
case there was no arrest warrant,
MR. EDMONDS:
THE COURT:
MR. EDMONDS:

Okay.

Thank you.

Who is going to prepare that order?
Mr. Bunderson had a problem with

preparing it before.

I assume that problem still

exists so I'll have another go at it.
THE COURT:

Very well.

If you will prepare tha

and submit it to the court.

Court will be in recess

THE BAILIFF:

Court will be in recess.

(Concluded at 3:55 p.m.)

